Dressing up for school: beyond rights and welfare by Monk, Daniel
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Monk, Daniel (2017) Dressing up for school: beyond rights and welfare.
In: Dinter, S. and Schneider, R. (eds.) Transdicsiplinary Perspectives on
Childhood in Contemporary Britain. Studies in Childhood, 1700 to the
Present. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 210-229. ISBN 9781138232105.
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/21456/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
  
‘Dressing up for school: beyond rights and welfare’ 
Daniel Monk 
 
Taking dress seriously is not new in childhood studies. Indeed one could argue that 
Aries’ seminal thesis about the invention of childhood based on representations in 
Western art, relied too extensively on dress. Yet at the same time, dress, particularly 
when coupled with the ambivalent term “fashion”, can still sometimes be perceived as 
trivial, especially in the context of ever increasing inequality. Moreover, within 
mainstream legal studies, a discipline that privileges the text, there exists a marked 
reluctance to acknowledge the significance of the visual (Moran 2012). This is 
paradoxical, for the legal profession attaches more importance to costume than most 
and law itself has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the regulation of 
dress, from the sumptuary laws of the past to present day disputes based on human 
rights (Robson 2013). And in contemporary Britain it is conflicts between children 
and schools that dominate these disputes.  
‘20 girls sent home in row over skimpy skirts’ (Metro, Thursday 5 January 
2017) 
‘Schoolboy in skirt protest wins right to wear shorts’ (Daily Telegraph, 
Saturday 26 May 2012) 
‘Boy, 12, fights “racist” school ban on his cornrow hair’ (Daily Telegraph, 12 
May 2011) 
‘Teenager isolated over cancer charity haircut’ (BBC News, 3 February 2015) 
‘Muslim boys told their beards breach school rules’ (The Guardian, 7 
November 2013) 
‘School sends girl, 14, home for wearing a Sikh bracelet’ (Daily Mail, 7 
November 2007) 
‘More pupils sent home in uniform row’ (BBC News, 7 September 2016) 
The above are just a few examples of headlines that appear on a regular basis in the 
British media. Legislation provides the framework for establishing and enforcing 
school dress codes; and conflicts in the courts are resolved by judges through the 
creative arts of statutory interpretation and the application of human rights doctrines. 
The aim here is not to suggest a correct way of resolving these conflicts. Rather, the 
key argument is that school dress, located at the point where education policies 
  
intersect with broader cultural and political concerns about religion, sexuality, gender 
and class, provides a rich site for thinking about childhood in contemporary Britain.  
A key premise is that taking school dress seriously requires thinking critically 
about the existing frameworks within which contemporary debates are located. This 
chapter begins by highlighting the limitations of thinking about school dress through 
the framework of the uniform/no uniform binary and suggests reasons for the 
contemporary move towards uniforms. It then looks at how law frames the issue as a 
disciplinary matter and examines the implications of this for contemporary debates 
about gender, bullying and school governance. It concludes by looking at two cases 
where children – unusually – were successful in challenging a dress code; and in 
doing so highlights the contingency of contemporary understandings and applications 
of children’s rights. 
 
Framing Dress Codes as School Uniforms 
Conversations about school dress codes are often reduced to a debate about school 
uniforms in which opponents tread a familiar path. On one side are arguments against 
uniforms premised on autonomy, freedom of expression and a liberal, individualistic 
understanding of child development. These are arguments that can easily lay claim to 
being supportive of ‘children’s rights’. They are countered, on the other side, by 
claims about the individual and collective benefits of uniforms (such as improved 
school behaviour, self-respect/discipline, economic savings and social cohesion). 
These arguments can lay claim to representing the ‘best interests’ of children and, 
consequently, advocates of school uniforms can also claim to be supportive of 
‘children’s rights’. Consequently, the debate provides a classic example of how 
‘rights’ – and children’s rights in particular – are open to conflicting definitions and 
applications and function as rhetorical legal tools (Eekelaar 1992). 
While opposing school uniforms is often perceived as a more ‘progressive’ 
position, the stance too easily elides with a tendency within liberal rights accounts 
generally (and certainly with children) to juxtapose juridical commands – such as 
dress codes – against a notion of freedom and the enhancing of individualism. In this 
formulation repealing a uniform code ‘liberates a child’ enabling a ‘real’ authentic 
child to be made visible. In other words, a school uniform functions discursively, and 
not just materially, ‘as a layer on top of an underlying subject’ (Lesnik Oberstein 
2011, 4). This restrictive narrative is not unusual, even in accounts that adopt an 
  
explicitly constructivist approach to childhood, despite the fact, as Karin Lesnik 
Oberstein (2011) has highlighted, that to reach this position constructivism is not 
necessary and is to a certain extent misunderstood.  
Yet while the representation of the un-uniformed child as a more autonomous 
subject overlooks the complexities of power and governance, it is not that arguments 
in favour of school uniforms are in any way more compelling. Rather, a more critical 
reading of the pro-school uniform discourse questions not imply the claimed effects 
of uniforms, but the underlying aspirations attributed to them. In other words, the 
opposing desires - to liberate children from uniforms and to empower children by 
uniforms - are both investments in the mastery of childhood and rather than 
questioning the category they both demonstrate the enduring resilience of childhood 
as a category within adult imagination.  
One way to mark the closeness of these investments is to note how the 
uniform/no uniform binary masks the often very detailed regulation of dress in 
schools that do not have uniforms. While these rules are framed in the negative, 
unlike uniform policies that dictate what must be worn, they too represent dress codes 
and are legitimised and enforced by the same laws. Moreover, these dress codes are 
particularly revealing as a site for thinking about contemporary childhood, for they 
are premised not on what is appropriate for a particular school but assumptions about 
what is appropriate for children per se. At stake here is the relationship between 
idealised ‘pupil-hood’ and legitimate ‘childhood’. 
One could, justifiably, ask: what debate about uniforms? For arguably one of 
the most notable contemporary aspects about the uniform question is the very absence 
of it. Those who argue in favour of uniforms have – to put it crudely – won. Silences 
are revealing here. From the Children’s Commission of England there is not a word 
against uniforms or dress codes. When they are mentioned, it is only in the context of 
their cost, the appropriate penalties for non-compliance, and their impact on ethnic 
minorities (OCC 2013, 2012). This is a notable shift and reflects the extent to which 
moves to relax or do without uniforms in the 1970s have been halted or reversed. 
Putting aside the validity of the arguments for or against uniforms, which raise 
complex empirical questions of causality, what is clear is that the aspirations for 
childhood, which uniforms are currently imbued with, cohere with broader political 
shifts and ideologies. That this is the case is all the more evident by the very British 
nature of the concern about school dress. That uniforms and dress codes are extremely 
  
rare in most other European countries, reinforces the conclusion that the importance 
attached to them in Britain is far more than a concern about child welfare. 
Comparative perspectives here reveal national and political histories (Dussel 2001), 
but while schools in Scotland and Wales are markedly less likely to adopt uniforms 
than in England or Northern Ireland (OFT, 2012), the reasons for this have yet to be 
explored. 
The traditional conservative school uniform – blazers and ties – has a long 
tradition in the independent school sector and was adopted by most grammar schools 
(Davidson, ???). Apart from the small number of progressive private schools, 
relaxation of dress codes and abolition of uniforms was far more common among 
comprehensive schools. In this way upper and middle class childhood was visibly 
distinguished: the more traditional and strict the uniform the ‘posher’ the children; the 
elaborate uniforms of Eton – the grandest of all public schools – exemplifies this 
visual material hierarchy. But with the increasing ‘privatisation’ of maintained 
schools, in particular with the introduction of ‘independent’ academies and a steady 
weakening of the role of local authorities (Harris 2012), the traditional model of 
uniforms has increasingly been applied to non-selective maintained schools (Mintel, 
2010). The resulting rendering of class inequalities less visible has occurred at a time 
when social mobility, in practice, has significantly reduced (Dorling 2015). Uniforms 
achieve two ends here; first they serve to mask inequality, reinforcing the myth of 
classlessness; and secondly, they communicate a subtle solution to inequality, in 
which ‘private’ is best. In his diary, New Labour’s media advisor Alastair Campbell 
records the following conversation with Tony Blair in 2000: 
“He said the problem with schools was uniformity of teaching. I said the 
problem was the background of poorer kids and he just rolled his eyes at me” 
(quoted in Wagg 2014, 179, emphasis added).  
This exchange indicates how the adoption of uniforms – a very visual way of 
communicating pedagogical uniformity and the centrality of a focus on ‘standards’ – 
has all the right connotations in what Stephen Wagg has described as a culture war; an 
explicit rejection of permissive education policies of the past and a ‘disinclination to 
see a child’s educational performance as being utilized by social factors’ (2014, 179). 
This contemporary symbolic use of uniforms is evident in the image from the 
Bede Academy School.  
 
  
[insert image 1: Image: http://www.bedeacademy.org.uk] 
 
Established in 2009 by the Emmanuel Foundation, the traditional uniform, which is 
typical, indeed almost de rigueur, for academies, albeit unremarked on, asserts its 
commitment to a nostalgic image of childhood and at the same time aspirations 
informed by the traditions of the private sector. Strict traditional uniforms visibly 
communicate their distinctiveness and superiority. Whether or not the uniforms 
achieve their stated aims is a complex empirical question. The point here is the extent 
to which concerns about contemporary childhood draw on the uniform as a signifier.  
It is well documented that the structural changes to state education since 1979 
have recast parents as consumers; albeit that the reality of parental choice and power 
is questionable and, without any doubt, deeply classed (Ball 2008; Harris 2007). In an 
increasingly market-based education system the image of the pupils from the Bede 
Academy is targeted at parents who, less than children, are largely in favour of them 
(Mintel, 2010). In this way, emphasising tradition and discipline, they mirror broader 
political shifts in education where the emphasis is on playing ‘to the aspirations (and 
fears) of a particular demographic – the upwardly mobile and/or lower-middle class 
voter’ (Wagg 2014, 180). 
The market for uniforms and clothes that conform to dress codes is highly 
competitive, with supermarkets such as Tesco and Aldi challenging the monopoly of 
traditional school outfitters by providing ‘uniforms’ at significantly lower prices. Yet 
despite the lower prices the increase in secondary schools adopting uniforms has 
meant that the schoolwear market  - worth £450M per annum - is still forecast to 
increase (Mintel 2010). The availability of cheaper uniforms to a certain extent rebuts 
arguments against uniforms based on expense (Hawkes 2009), and while individual 
schools have discretion about uniforms, the government, eager to support uniforms, 
has issued specific guidance about cost to facilitate them (DfE 2015).  
The annual ‘back to school’ campaigns by supermarkets to advertise their 
schoolwear present representations similar to that of the Bede Academy. The children 
are imbued with nostalgia for a past, where childhood is perceived to have been safer 
and more innocent. Yet, at the same time, the images are not traditional in the sense of 
the children being ‘seen but not heard’; rather they are portrayed as laughing, smiling 
and relaxed and, perhaps most importantly, seemingly happy. The dominant 
contemporary construction of childhood requires children to be good studious hard 
  
working pupils, but, now, also happy. The relative unhappiness of children in 
contemporary Britain has been widely reported, albeit that the basis of these claims 
has been effectively critiqued (Morrow and Mayell 2009). The images skillfully 
reconcile the contemporary injunction for children, as well as everyone else, to be 
happy, with the critique of the progressiveness of permissive education policies. 
The images of happy children in traditional uniforms also bare a remarkable 
resemblance to the preeminent fictional contemporary child: Harry Potter. David 
Rudd (2014) has commented on the tendency to critique contemporary children’s 
literature as either ‘infantalising’ or ‘adultifying’ children. And one can read the 
images here through the same lens. The uniforms draw on adult-like suits and imbue 
the children with the ideal adult-like qualities of hard work and self-discipline. But at 
the same time the evident nostalgia locates them in a space free from adult-like 
concerns and dangers and contemporary uncertainties. For Rudd the ‘entrenched 
notions of “essence” of either child or adult’ persisted precisely because these 
categories were no longer so secure: there was a slippage’ (ibid., 124). Heightened 
concern with school dress demonstrates both the commitment to childhood as a 
category and its fragility. 
 
Framing dress codes as ‘school discipline’ 
Within education law and policy dress codes are categorised as a discipline issue. The 
current government guidance to schools, under the heading ‘Discipline’, states that: 
‘The head teacher can discipline your child for not wearing the school 
uniform. Your child can be suspended or excluded if they repeatedly ignore 
the uniform rules’ (GOV.UK 2016; see also DfE 2013). 
The statutory basis for this is in Chapter 1, ‘School Discipline’, of the Education and 
Inspections Act 2006, which places the responsibility for discipline and behaviour on 
Governors (Section 88) and Head Teachers (Section 89). Framing the issue of dress as 
a discipline issue is not a ‘neutral’ categorisation. Law does not simply stipulate rules 
and procedures but legitimises particular narratives. Critically in this context it frames 
challenges and resistance to dress codes as a behavioural problem of individual pupils 
and restricts the formal debate to questions about the appropriate methods of 
enforcement. A key concern has been the use of exclusions. In 1999 the New Labour 
government, as part of a broader attempt to reduce school exclusions, issued 
Guidance that advised that breaches of dress codes would be an inappropriate ground 
  
for exclusion (DfEE 1999). But under pressure from Head teachers and teachers’ 
unions this was revised to enable more flexibility (DfEE 2000). And, contrary to the 
recommendations of the Children’s Commissioner (2012), there is now no question 
that breaches of dress codes can give rise to exclusion (DfE 2013). 
The centrality of law in the regulation of school dress is not inevitable This 
‘juridification’ is marked across many areas of society and especially education. 
Indeed in many countries the category or practice of Education Law is looked on with 
astonishment. ‘But what has law got to do with special educational needs, admissions 
or school discipline?’ is a question English lawyers are asked by continental 
colleagues. Noting the contingency of law is critical to reading law as narrative rather 
than as doctrine or simply as rules, as it enables law to be understood as ‘artefacts that 
reveal a culture, not just policies that shape that culture’ (Gewirtz 1996, 3).  
 
Gender and Bullying 
One consequence resulting from the framing of dress-as-discipline is the extent to 
which dress is absent from mainstream concerns about bullying. For example, 
empirical research about homophobic bullying has repeatedly found that it is non-
conformity with gender stereotypes, rather than sexual identity per se, that is a critical 
causal factor of bullying behaviour (Monk 2011). Framed as a discipline issue, the 
problematic behaviour is the physical and verbal behaviour of other pupils. The role 
of dress codes in policing gender performance is not the object of concern. Pupils that 
fail to comply with gendered dress codes are not perceived as victims of bullying but 
are themselves often legitimately ‘disciplined’. The individualisation of the bullying 
discourse consequently silences the institutional policing of gender roles. Campaigns 
against homophobic bullying are sometimes complicit with this and demonstrate the 
contingency of mainstream concerns. An example of this is a poster produced by a 
national campaign in Ireland in 2006, which was praised as ‘Good Practice’ in 2009 
by a Committee of the Council of Europe. 
 
[insert image 2: from BeLonG campaign in partnership with the Equality Authority, 
at: http://www.belongto.org/pro/page.aspx?subsectionid=4663] 
 
Posing under the headlines, ‘He’s Gay and we’re cool with that’ and ‘She’s gay and 
we’re cool with that’, uniformed school pupils send out the message that gay and 
  
lesbian pupils are just the same as everybody else; an important, and hard won, 
achievement. But in equating ‘equal treatment’ with ‘sameness’ the image fails to 
address the evidence that it is pupils who present and behave in ways that are not the 
same who are most likely to be victims of bullying. In doing so the image coheres 
with concerns by numerous commentators about the conditionality of inclusion 
(Brown 1995). Moreover in this context the compliance with the gendered uniforms – 
the boys in trousers and the girls in skirts – inscribes uniforms as a form of protection 
from harm. In other words, it suggests that uniforms, by rendering sexuality invisible, 
can aid cohesion and a sense of belonging, an argument that is used more generally as 
a defence for school uniforms in relation to socio-economic distinctions between 
pupils.  
Decisions about the gendered aspects of school dress codes have wider 
significance. Recently, albeit exceptionally, some head teachers, exercising their 
discretion, have relaxed rules and demonstrated an awareness of the existence of trans 
children (Griffiths 2016). ‘Progressiveness’ can work in other directions too. For 
example, promoting equality between men and women has been upheld as a 
legitimate basis for banning the jilbab (Carney and Sinclair 2006). Cases about 
Islamic clothing have been highly politicised by the legal challenges. Law is complicit 
with this emphasis by providing no possibility of redress for gendered dress codes. 
Discrimination law – while emerging in both the UK and USA – is of limited use in 
this context (Wintemute 1997; Murray 2013). An example of this is the case of 
McMillen (Chairman of the Board of Governors of Ballyclare High School), Re 
Judicial Review [2008] NIQB 21, where a pupil attempted to challenge rules about 
the hair length of boys. The decision made clear that it was a discipline issue and not 
a school management issue and that while questions about procedural fairness can 
legitimately be challenged, the rules themselves cannot. In upholding the sanctions 
against the boy, the court held that ‘its legality is the issue rather than its wisdom’ (at 
para [45]).  
Further gendered dimensions of dress codes are evident in the policy of 
Fortismere School, a co-educational comprehensive in north London. Proudly 
distinguishing itself from the growing trend of schools to adopt uniforms, the school’s 
dress code policy opens with the following statement:  
‘Clothing can be a powerful means of expression. We are proud of our 
students and respect their individuality’. 
  
 However it then the following various prohibitions: 
‘However, some clothing is inappropriate for school. So absolutely no . . see-
through clothing or strapless tops . . . inappropriately ripped or torn garments . 
. . sheer leggings . . . T shirts or other clothing with offensive slogans or 
images . . . drug or alcohol logos’ (Fortismere, 2017). 
Cartoon images of the prohibited items are included and drawn in a playful humorous 
fashion. While the clothing illustrated is deemed inappropriate there is at the same 
time a ‘knowingness’, a Carry On film/seaside postcard humour about them, which 
acknowledges that children will be able to understand the humour. The vehicle of the 
cartoon itself provides a licence that is perhaps not available for photographic images. 
The form in this way conveys an ambivalent message: pupils may ‘know’ about drugs 
and sex – but cannot dress in a way that performs their knowingness. This approach to 
dress codes coheres closely with the development of policies about Sex and Relation 
Education introduced by the New Labour government. In marked contrast to the 
approach of the previous Conservative administrations, statutory reform supported by 
new guidance to schools demonstrated a willingness to more openly acknowledge the 
reality of sexual activity amongst young people. But it did so explicitly in order to 
reduce teenage pregnancy and to advocate the benefits of delaying sexual activity 
(Monk 2001).  
Jane Pilcher has noted how the contemporary focus on sexualised clothing 
marks a shift of concern away from ‘teenagers’ towards fashions of children more 
generally, and that while the explicit focus is gender neutral the concern is primarily 
about girls (2014). Rebecca Raby similarly notes that, ‘boys’ (hetero)sexuality was 
only relevant’ to the extent that boys might be ‘distracted by girls’ provocative 
clothing, a position holding girls responsible for boys’ sexual desires’ (2010, 350). In 
research with girls about how they experience these rules, what is clear is that they 
sometimes desired the problematised clothing but ‘gave meaning to these terms in 
ways that are different from adults’ (Pilcher 2014, 264) and negotiate them in 
complex and often contradictory ways (Raby 2010; Bragg 2012). For example, Raby 
quotes girls in a focus group commenting on the rules in the following way: 
Catherine: That’s like, the spaghetti strap rule is like kind of unfortunate 
because it’s like, for boys it’s not a problem, and it’s just like, “Sorry I’m a 
female like and it’s hot and I would like to wear a spaghetti strap tank top”, 
  
but it’s like “No, no you must not expose skin”, which is kind of ridiculous 
‘cause 
Janice: You are not even showing anything, just your arm [laughs] 
Catherine: Yeah, you’re really not; it’s just your body; it’s like “Oh no the 
human body!” (2010, 340) 
The wide scale application of these largely unquestioned and un-researched dress 
codes reflects deep-seated fears about child sexuality. Childhood innocence is one of 
the most consistent constructions of modern and contemporary childhood, and its 
dominance is clear from the title of the DfE’s policy paper, which addresses some of 
these concerns: ‘Letting Children be Children’ (2011). The school is a particularly 
critical space for upholding the norm of the, ideally, non-sexual child. Practical advice 
for children who are sexually active is now more readily available, but it is more 
frequently located outside of the school in health settings; advocating ‘good health’ 
for children is more palatable than ‘good sex’ (Monk 2001). Taking the long view, 
Christine Piper notes that, ‘there is a sense in which the benefits of welfarism have 
always gone hand in hand with desexualising children’ (2000, 40).  
Concerns about sexualisation are linked to more recent concerns about the 
commercialisation of childhood. The Labour Party manifesto in 2010 stated that it 
would provide support for parents who wished to challenge ‘aggressive or sexualized 
commercial marketing’ and would ‘ask Consumer Focus to develop a website for 
parents to register their concerns about sexualized products aimed at children’ (2010, 
para 6.3). Pilcher discusses the varied ways in which this focus has continued to 
dominate government agendas, with the British Retail Consortium encouraging 
‘responsible retailing guidelines to preserve the innocence of our children’ (2014, 
262). This is the wider context to the adoption of restrictive dress codes and the 
perception of them as seemingly uncontroversial common-sense, even by avowedly 
progressive schools that reject uniforms. It can best be explained by a curious 
concatenation of contemporary discourses: traditional and welfarist desires to ‘protect 
childhood/treasure innocence’; feminist concerns about the sexual objectification of 
young women’s bodies; and, a progressive/left critique of the tentacles of neo-
liberalism.  
 
Reconstructing head teachers and parents 
  
While ideals of childhood are explicit in school dress codes, contemporary conflicts 
about dress also highlight the shifting roles of head teachers and parents, which 
similarly reflect broader social and educational developments. 
The power of head teachers, in matters of school discipline in particular, has 
become a highly politicised issue with political parties competing to emphasise their 
support for enhancing their powers (Monk 2005). The attempts by New Labour to 
limit school exclusions, noted above, were met with fierce and effective resistance. 
School Exclusion Panels no longer have the power to order a reinstatement and 
persistent breaches of dress codes are a lawful basis for temporary and permanent 
exclusions (Revell 2001). One of the underlying rationales for exclusions being 
perceived as a proportionate response to breaches of dress codes is that it is 
disobedience per se, and in particular a refusal to acknowledge the authority of the 
head teacher that justified the ultimate punishment, and not the consequences of the 
unacceptable article of clothing or hairstyle.  
Head teachers now have more power than ever before. This reconstruction of 
the head teacher has been represented as a return to the past, where head teachers are 
imbued with a common sense natural authority – not dissimilar to the image of 
matrons in hospitals.  Like uniforms, this nostalgic vision of head teachers owes much 
to the valourisation of the traditions of public schools. Alongside this is a more recent 
managerialsim discourse (Ball 1994). Ken Jones has argued that the emphasis on 
leadership and ‘superheads’ demonstrates how schools are defined more strongly than 
at any time since 1944 ‘as places where management authority, rather than collegial 
culture, establishes the ethos and culture of the school’ (2003, 161). A heightened 
emphasis on uniforms and stricter dress codes supports the nostalgic discourse and 
heightened resistance to any challenges to the breaches of them supports the new 
model of managerial authority. 
The authority of the head teacher has implications not only for pupils but also 
for parents. For legal scholars the shifting meanings of parental responsibility is a key 
contemporary issue. Debates about whether the concept emphasises parental authority 
and enhances privacy rights, or whether it defines appropriate parenting and 
legitimises increased surveillance of parents, have long been debated, and the shift to 
the latter identified and variously praised or critiqued (Eekelaar 1991; Reece 2009). 
Compliance with dress codes is one contemporary indicator of ‘responsible’ 
parenting, alongside others such as obesity and school homework and attendance 
  
more generally. The shifting regulation of dress codes in this way is part of a broader 
move towards heightened surveillance of parents. Legitimised through concerns 
premised on child welfare, the legal framework emphasises the overarching 
individualistic focus. Law consequently plays a role in formally masking the extent to 
which the increasing emphasis on the ‘responsibilisation’ of parents has marked 
classed and race effects (Parton 2014; Gillies and Edwards 2011). Middle class 
parenting is offered as the solution to cycles of poverty for working class parents and 
childhoods; as Val Gillies notes, ‘the concept of “the personal is political” is 
increasingly articulated as “the personal is the only political”’ (2011, 207). 
 
Children’s Rights 
For some it might appear paradoxical that the contemporary presence of dress codes 
has been sustained, indeed re-energised, in an age when children’s rights have 
become increasingly embedded in law and more widely accepted. That this is the case 
can most easily be explained by the fact that ‘children’s rights’, like all rights, are 
open to conflicting interpretations, and in this context welfare-based concerns have 
simply trumped claims based on autonomy. Where pupils do attempt to challenge 
dress codes through the courts they are invariably unsuccessful, as the judges have 
demonstrated a marked reluctance to interfere with the discretion of schools and head 
teachers. The rare cases where the courts uphold a pupil’s challenge are often hailed 
as ‘children’s rights’ victories; the accuracy of these claims is questionable and two of 
these cases are explored below. But whether successful or not, the cases as a whole, 
which often receive wide coverage in the media, reflect not just individual challenges 
but texts about moments of rupture and tension in contemporary childhood.  
Many of the high profile cases about school dress codes frequently concern 
religion. And without any doubt the issue that has received the most attention is ‘the 
veil’, the wearing of either the hijab or jilbab by Moslem girls. The key case in the 
UK is R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh 
High School [2006] UKHL 15, which upheld a school’s ban on the wearing of the 
jilbab. A huge amount has been written about this case and the issue more widely, 
both in the UK and in other jurisdictions. Indeed ‘the veil’ has become one of the 
flashpoint issues in western societies, a symbol that brings to fore tensions and 
contradictions within liberal democracy and feminism (see, for example, Marshall 
2008; Goldrick 2006; Smith 2007; Lyon and Spini 2004).
 
Moreover, to the extent that 
  
these issues are informed by and intersect with debates about global politics - ‘the war 
against terror’ and ‘islamophobia’ - in relation to concerns about children it can be 
connected to the recent and highly controversial government ‘Prevent’ agenda and 
concerns about ‘radicalisation’ (McDonald 2011; Coppock and McGovern 2014; 
Stanley and Guru 2015). The degree to which ‘the veil’ is a focus point for concerns 
is also demonstrated by the relatively little attention that school dress codes more 
generally attract. Its very exceptionality - its otherness - is reinforced by the attention. 
Other issues, uniforms more generally and hair length, shoulder straps, visible 
underwear, attract very little attention. But the seeming mundanity of these issues, the 
‘common sense’ acceptance of them, and the relatively small scholarly attention to 
they receive, are significant in understanding contemporary childhood. Law is critical 
here, for ‘religion’ as a protected category is to a certain extent privileged in 
challenges; these are not always successful – as the Begum case attests – but what is 
accepted is that religion creates the space for the most legitimate exception to school 
dress codes.  The uniform policy of Hampstead School, a large London co-
educational comprehensive, highlights these distinctions in practice. Exercising its 
lawful discretion in this area, and demonstrating a commitment to diversity and 
inclusion, the policy permits the wearing of the Jilbab – the full body covering that 
led to the exclusion of Begum - but at the same time does not permit: ‘Hair dye which 
is not a natural colour’ or ‘Patterns shaved or cut into hair’ (Hampstead School 2016). 
Such a policy is without any doubt lawful; and the aim here is not to question 
its wisdom. But it highlights a particular form of public – albeit local - negotiation 
around children’s bodies, in particular the contingent symbolism of hair (Lesnik-
Oberstein 2006). While the policy may appear to be contradictory from a children’s 
rights perspective that emphasises autonomy, the analysis of the following successful 
challenges indicates the underlying rationality of such a contradiction. 
In R v (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls School 
Governors [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin), Sarika Angel Watkins-Singh, a 14-year-old 
Sikh girl, challenged her school’s refusal to allow her to wear the Kara - a religious 
steel bangle. The wearing of the Kara contravened the school’s policy relating to 
jewellery, which permitted only one pair of plain stud earrings and a wristwatch. In G 
v St Gregory’s Catholic Science College [2011] EWHC 1452 an 11-year-old boy 
challenged his school’s refusal to allow him to wear his hair in cornrows, a form of 
braiding. This hairstyle contravened the policy of the school, which stated that: 
  
‘Hair must be clean, neat and of a moderate style (boys must not wear braids). 
Peculiar and bizarre styles are quite unacceptable. These styles include, for 
example, hair that falls below the collar (for boy’s), wearing of hair 
extensions, bleached, dyed, tinted or highlighted hair, closely cropped or 
shaved hair, and patterns and lines cut into the hair. Furthermore pupils must 
be clean-shaven at all times and the shaving of eyebrows is not acceptable. 
Pupils whose hairstyles are unacceptable will not be admitted to school and 
risk disciplinary action.’ (para 19). 
In both cases it was accepted that the rules per se were lawful. As the court stated in 
the Gregory case, the school was ‘entitled to adopt a uniform policy, including what 
haircuts are permissible, which is or may seem to be very restrictive or conservative’ 
(para 8). The legal question in both cases was whether or not the pupils could 
legitimately be exempt from the rules. In other words, from the outset the cases rest 
on ‘exceptionality’, requiring the pupils to establish that they were outside of the 
norm. The challenges in both cases succeeded by establishing that the school policies 
were a form of indirect indiscrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976 and the 
Equality Act 2010, in the first case against Sikhs and in the second against boys from 
an African-Caribbean background. But what in this context is interesting is noting 
how the courts distinguish these claims from the far more prevalent unsuccessful 
claims. In particular, why the wearing of a Sikh kara was acceptable but not the jilbab 
or a Christian ‘purity’ ring. And why cornrow braided hair was acceptable for boys 
from one background but not for others. The different doctrinal rules relied on 
provide a formal means of distinguishing the cases; in particular the differences 
between Human Rights claims based on religious freedom of expression and indirect 
discrimination claims based on equality legislation (Howard 2011). Another 
distinction often drawn refers to practical or ‘health and safety’ issues relating to 
particular articles of clothing or long hair. But underlying these arguments, reading 
between the lines of the judgments - or in the words of the critical legal theorist Alan 
Norrie, ‘not taking law’s word for it’ (2005, 8) - it is possible to explain the 
exceptionality of these claims as judicial and social constructions of contemporary 
‘good’ childhood.  
The first key point emphasised in both cases is that the decisions to wear the 
Kara and adopt the cornrow style, while individual choices are expressions of 
collective religious and ethnic identity, respectively; in other words, they are 
  
explicitly not expressions of individuality. The wearing of the Kara here was 
contrasted with the wearing of a purity ring in an earlier case of R (on the application 
of Lydia Playfoot (A Child) v Millais School Governing Body [2007] EWHC 1698 
(Admin). The girl in that case failed in her challenge largely because it was held that 
she was not ‘obliged’ by her religion to wear the ring, as it was not considered to be 
‘intimately linked’ to her Christian beliefs. Similarly a factor that went against 
Begum, was the suggestion that large numbers of Muslim girls at the school, 
supported by religious authorities, complied with Islamic religious requirements by 
wearing the hijab as opposed to the full jilbab. In the context of these religious 
symbol cases a binary is constructed between individual choice and obligation to a 
higher authority individual choice, the former, while recognised, is at the same time 
problematised. As Bruno Latour writes in the context of iconclasm, there is ‘an 
impossible double bind’:  
‘If you say it is man-made you nullify the transcendence of the divinities . . . 
The more the human hand can be seen as having worked on an image, the 
weaker is the image’s claim to offer truth’ (2002, 18). 
A similar ambivalence about ‘choice’ is evident in distinguishing the cases about 
hairstyles. In the Gregory case it is because the boy obviously had no choice over his 
ethnicity that legitimised his claim. As the judge made clear: ‘more than choice is 
needed to constitute a particular disadvantage’ (para 38). It was, consequently, 
essential for the cornrows to be distinguished from ‘fashion’. As the judge noted: 
‘choice or a desire to adopt a particular fashion is no good reason to be permitted not 
to abide by the policy’ (para 8). There is an acknowledgment here that for some the 
cornrow hairstyle is ‘merely’ a question of ‘fashion’. Indeed the boy himself is quoted 
in the case as saying:  
‘Every race has differences, in religion and culture, the plaiting is ours, and I 
would like to keep it, it's the one thing I really like, and the best part was when 
I saw my idol, David Beckham, cornrow his hair, it showed me that he 
appreciated African hair styling, and that we are all the same underneath it all’ 
(para 33). 
While the boy in this statement appears to read Beckham’s hairstyle as a form of 
cultural appreciation, the clear implication of the ruling, however, is that white boys 
in the school are forbidden from adopting the cornrow hairstyle. For them to do so 
would be a pure choice, whether informed by a desire to be ‘fashionable’ or to 
  
express, implicitly or otherwise, an expression of solidarity or celebration of multi-
culturalism. Legal discourse’s requirement of ‘exceptionality’, while informed by 
respect for difference and inclusion, ironically, fosters ethnic demarcation. The law 
here also implicitly coheres with an emerging contemporary trend that would crudely 
judge Beckham’s adoption of the cornrow style to be a problematic form of ‘cultural 
appropriation’ (Patterson 2015).  
Both cases indicate that forbidding expressions of anything that might be 
termed ‘political’ – broadly defined - is one of the justifications for the dress codes 
and a means to demarcate legitimate religious or cultural ‘choices’. In the Gregory 
case the school’s banning of skinheads was justified on the basis of its association 
with far right political groups; arguments made to suggest that it is a style ‘common in 
some eastern European cultures’ (para 47), and in this way akin to cornrows, were 
firmly rejected. As the judge made clear:  
‘There is . . . not a shred of evidence to suggest that anything but choice could 
lead to a skin head cut’ (para 48). 
That pure choices, those not required by religion or motivated by belonging to an 
ethnic group, can be perceived as ‘political’ and the claimants as potential or real 
troublemakers is clear from earlier cases. In the Begum case the claimants behaviour 
was described as ‘unnecessarily confrontational’ (Lord Scott at para [80]). And 
concerns were raised that she was under the influence of her brother; that she was 
effectively, in contemporary political parlance, ‘at risk of radicalisation’ (Coppock 
and McGovern 2014). Conversely in the Gregory case, it was emphasised that the boy 
‘was not coached in any way’ (para 34). He had also moved to another school where 
he was able to keep his cornrow hairstyle. Whereas Begum was criticised for not 
making such attempts, allegedly, because she was ‘intent upon enforcing her “rights”’ 
(Lord Hoffmann, para 52). In the Playfoot case the pupil was described as having 
adopted a ‘moral stance’ (para 8) and the ring was described as ‘ostentatious’. 
Whereas in Watkins-Singh, the judge explicitly rejected the, ‘possibility that she is 
insisting on wearing the Kara in order to be rebellious or just to defy authority’ (para 
62). The legal discourse is avowedly secular, but one can read these distinctions as 
expressing a particular and traditional liberal Anglican suspicion of fundamentalism; 
a commitment to religious and ethnic diversity, alongside a rejection of any form of 
proselytising.  
  
Reading the successful challenges alongside the others reveals a policing of 
the adult/child boundary and once again concerns about the sexualisation of young 
girls. On the surface the wearing of the jilbab and the purity ring appear distinct from 
concerns about sexualisation, as both express commitments to traditional sexual 
morality and a desexualising of the school space. But the refusal to allow them 
arguably coheres with the codes that refuse to allow girls to reveal too much of their 
bodies, as the jilbab in Begum was perceived by some as unnecessary for girls and as 
a form of adult women’s clothing, and the chastity ring in Playfoot made visible the 
reality that school-girls do indeed make sexual choices. 
Gender was also critical in the cases about boys’ hairstyles. For in both the 
Gregory case and the Ballyclare case the pupils argued that the school dress codes 
amounted to unlawful sex discrimination: neither prevented long hair for girls and 
African Caribbean girls were permitted to wear cornrows. Drawing on earlier cases in 
the employment field, the judge in Gregory stated that ‘Rules concerning appearances 
will not be discriminatory because their content is different for men and women if 
they enforce a common principle of smartness or conventionality’ (para 54). And 
applying that rule held that: 
‘A rigid appearance policy at a school is clearly entirely reasonable provided it 
complies with equality law. Permitting long hair for girls and not for boys may 
be regarded as discriminatory since boys nowadays not unusually wear their 
hair longer. But I have no doubt that 'not unusual' does not equate to 
conventional and an appearance policy such as the one operated by the 
defendants is not discriminatory albeit it applies different rules to girls than for 
boys’ (para 60). 
Putting aside the circularity of this argument – the judge overlooks the impact of dress 
codes on what is considered conventional – what is clear here is the extent to which 
enforcing conventionality in effect becomes an additional legitimate aim of dress 
codes. 
Children’s rights – as an autonomy right – is almost totally absent from the 
cases. But in the Ballyclare case the fact that the school council had been consulted 
was held to be significant (para 4, 8, 9, 27). And the judge referred to both the 
requirements in Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which emphasises listening to children, and the importance of school councils 
as vehicles or mechanisms whereby a policy can be changed: 
  
‘it is necessary to establish that there is capacity for review of the [dress] code 
and there is capacity for the voice of the child to be heard . . . (para 30)’. 
But despite noting the Children’s Commissioner’s criticisms of the procedures in that 
school it had no effect on the decision (para 31). While a particular case, it reflects an 
increasing tendency whereby formal acceptance of the rhetoric about the importance 
of listening to children is translated into law in a way that becomes procedural and 
formalistic and easily marginalised (Fortin 2009). In the specific context of schools 
this demonstrates a tension between the potential accountability provided by School 
Councils and their functioning as a form of soft governance whereby they become a 
vehicle for legitimizing ‘conventionality’ (Gillies 2011). Injunctions to hear children 
and empower them through participatory processes and, at the same time, to 
effectively restrict their choices, can be seen as contradictory. But to do so overlooks 
the inclusion of contemporary childhood in the shift towards self-governance. 
Through this lens it is possible to make sense of the fact that girls can access 
contraception under the age of 16 while at the same time be prevented from adopting 
a particular hairstyle. For while starkly contradictory in terms of respecting bodily 
autonomy, to the extent that contraception precludes the presence of a pregnant girl in 
the classroom and coheres with government aims to reduce teenage pregnancy, 
accessing contraception and adhering to school ‘hairstyle’ codes both represent 
‘responsible’ decisions (Monk 2002). Children in contemporary Britain, 
consequently, have an active role to play in ensuring that childhood remains in place.  
 
Conclusion 
‘Children’s rights’ may have come of age in contemporary Britain, and there may be 
much to celebrate as a result, but it is important to recognise its inherent 
contradictions. These come to the fore in the context of contests about school dress, 
for what is evident are deep-seated tensions between autonomy rights, emphasising 
individual freedom, and welfare rights, premised on perceived benefits and risks of 
codes and certain clothing. There is a degree of triviality; it, perhaps, does not actually 
matter too much what children wear in school. But the aim here has been to 
demonstrate why and how it matters if one is interested in understanding 
contemporary British childhood. For underlying the welfare and autonomy based 
arguments about what real children should wear and what rules about clothing can 
achieve are a complex array of deeper assumptions and calculations. In education the 
  
contestation is a window into and visual representation of political debates about the 
perceived benefits of privatized education and a pedagogic shift from perceived 
permissiveness to uniformed standards. More widely the trends and contests highlight 
the shifts in long established and the emergence of new concerns and fears, such as 
sexualisation, radicalisation and ‘irresponsible’ parenting. Taking school dress 
seriously does not so much reveal contemporary childhood, but is a method that can 
unmask some of the conditions of possibility of the terms of its contestation, and its 
persistence and resilience as a site of political imaginations. 
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